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Why bank money creation?
Gersbach, Hans; Zelzner, Sebastian - 2022 - This version: April 20, 2022
We provide a rationale for bank money creation in our current monetary system by investigating its merits over a system …) costs from monitoring, aggregate lending to bank-dependent firms is inefficiently low. A monetary system with bank money … creation alleviates this problem, as banks can initiate lending by creating bank deposits without relying on household funding …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013187924
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Tax contracts and elections
Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik T. - 2009 - This version: December 2009
In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government. Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good provision and benefit from perks...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008746679
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Tax Contracts and Elections
Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik T. - 2010
In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government. Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good provision and benefit from perks...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199808
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Why bank money creation?
Gersbach, Hans; Zelzner, Sebastian - 2022
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013466607
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Default risk in stochastic volatility models
Gersbach, Hans; Surulescu, Nicolae Mircea - 2010 - This version: June 2010
We consider a stochastic volatility model of the mean-reverting type to describe the evolution of a firm’s values instead of the classical approach by Merton with geometric Brownian motions. We develop an analytical expression for the default probability. Our simulation results indicate that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008748331
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Default Risk in Stochastic Volatility Models
Gersbach, Hans - 2010
We consider a stochastic volatility model of the mean-reverting type to describe the evolution of a firm's values instead of the classical approach by Merton with geometric Brownian motions. We develop an analytical expression for the default probability. Our simulation results indicate that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013138808
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A theory of threshold contracts
Becker, Johannes Gerd; Gersbach, Hans - 2013 - This version: August 2013
We consider an in nitely repeated reappointment game in a principal- agent relationship. Typical examples are voter-politician or government- public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221102
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Default Risk in Stochastic Volatility Models
Gersbach, Hans; Surulescu, Nicolae - 2010
We consider a stochastic volatility model of the mean-reverting type to describe the evolution of a firm’s values instead of the classical approach by Merton with geometric Brownian motions. We develop an analytical expression for the default probability. Our simulation results indicate that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753195
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Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections
Gersbach, Hans - 2001
When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397764
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Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections
Gersbach, Hans - 2021
When politicians are short-term oriented or future elections do not sufficiently reflect the success of past policies, democratic elections cannot motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013321142