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Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections
Gersbach, Hans - 2001
When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397764
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Reelection threshold contracts in politics
Gersbach, Hans - 2001
When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011408440
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Information Markets, Elections and Contracts
Gersbach, Hans - 2011
Politicians may pander to public opinion and may renounce undertaking beneficial long-term projects. To alleviate this problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130416
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Reelection Threshold Contracts in Politics
Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena - 2021
When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320698
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Tax Contracts and Elections
Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik T. - 2010
In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government. Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good provision and benefit from perks...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199808
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Incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi-task problems
Gersbach, Hans - 2004
We consider a model with a politician facing a multi-task problem while in office. The reelection mechanism distorts the allocation of effort in favor of tasks whose outcomes can be measured more precisely than others. We show that a hierarchy of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014145815
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Higher bars for incumbents and experience
Gersbach, Hans; Müller, Markus - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009577561
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Costs of change, political polarization, and re-election hurdles
Gersbach, Hans; Muller, Philippe; Tejada, Oriol - 2015 - This version: August 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409981
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History-bound reelections
Gersbach, Hans - 2015 - This version: November 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409997
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Costs of Change, Political Polarization, and Re-Election Hurdles
Gersbach, Hans - 2015
welfare and the lowest polarization levels. We apply our model to the design of optimal re-election hurdles. In particular, we … show that raising the vote-share needed for re-election above 50% weakly reduces policy polarization and tends to increase … welfare. Furthermore, we identify circumstances where the optimal re-election hurdle is strictly larger than 50% …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013015793