benefits only if they aggregate their private information. Some members of the society, however, are harmed by socially … desirable policies and aim at manipulating information aggregation by misrepresenting their private information. We show that … information can be aggregated and a socially desirable policy can be implemented under a new class of democratic mechanisms …

problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and … democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while threshold contracts … stipulate a price level on the political information market that a politician must reach to have the right to stand for …

We examine the value of public information when a society uses a social choice rule to decide among a set of outcomes … off by public information. We apply the proposition to collective information acquisition and to irreversible investments …

government, to foresee the effects of long-term decisions. Agents with much information about the consequences of decisions … should invest either immediately or never. Poorly informed agents should wait for better information. We identify pooling …

problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and … democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while threshold contracts … stipulate a price level on the political information market that a politician must reach to have the right to stand for …