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Rules vs. Targets : Climate Treaties Under Uncertainty
Gersbach, Hans; Oberpriller, Quirin - 2012
We demonstrate the advantages of a climate treaty based solely on rules for international permit markets when there is uncertainty about abatement costs and environmental damages. Such a ‘Rules Treaty’ comprises a scaling factor and a refunding rule. Each signatory can freely choose the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014041072
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A Reform Dilemma in Polarized Democracies
Gersbach, Hans - 2016
We study the feasibility and efficiency of policy reforms in polarized democracies. We develop a simple election model where (i) reforms are costly for voters and politicians and these costs increase with the extent of policy change, and (ii) politicians differ in their ability to carry out...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012985780
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Rules vs. targets : climate treaties under uncertainty
Gersbach, Hans; Oberpriller, Quirin - 2012 - This version: April 2012
We demonstrate the advantages of a climate treaty based solely on rules for international permit markets when there is uncertainty about abatement costs and environmental damages. Such a ‘Rules Treaty’ comprises a scaling factor and a refunding rule. Each signatory can freely choose the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009552905
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Risk and the value of information in irreversible decisions
Gersbach, Hans - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 42 (1997) 1, pp. 37-51
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001222710
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Contingent contracts in banking : insurance or risk magnification?
Gersbach, Hans - 2018 - This version: November 2018
generations, even if the underlying productivity risk is small or zero. We conclude that a joint policy package of orderly default …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932411
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Risk Sharing Capacity : Markets versus Households
Gersbach, Hans - 2014
-space approach of Arrow-Debreu. A host of new interesting economic issues emerge. First, risk averse agents can attempt to insure … an open question. Second, one may ask more specifically what is the role of social groups for risk sharing and risk … allocation when agents face idiosyncratic or aggregate risk. Third, does a suitable combination of social group formation and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013061191
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Sophisticated attacks on decoy ballots : a devil's menu and the market for lemons
Gersbach, Hans; Mamageishvili, Akaki; Tejada, Oriol - 2017 - This version: November 2017
Decoy ballots do not count in election outcomes, but otherwise they are indistinguishable from real ballots. By means of a game-theoretical model, we show that decoy ballots may not provide effective protection against a malevolent adversary trying to buy real ballots. If the citizenry is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011787216
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Incentive pay for policy-makers?
Britz, Volker; Ebrahimi, Afsoon; Gersbach, Hans - 2018 - This version: December 2018
We study how to efficiently motivate policy-makers to solve political multitask problems. Political multi-task problems typically have outcomes that are difficult to measure. Moreover, there are conflicts among citizens about optimal policies and the agents have the power to tax the citizens to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962135
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Tax contracts and elections
Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik T. - 2009 - This version: December 2009
In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government. Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good provision and benefit from perks...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008746679
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Information markets, elections and contracts
Gersbach, Hans; Müller, Markus - 2011
Politicians may pander to public opinion and may renounce undertaking beneficial long-term projects. To alleviate this problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009009663