We consider firms and multi-member households operating in a competitive market environment. Households are endowed with resources (commodity bundles) and shares of firm ownership. Household members are characterized by individual preferences, possibly with intra-household consumption...

We consider firms and multi-member households operating in a competitive market environment. Households are endowed with resources (commodity bundles) and shares of firm ownership. Household members are characterized by individual preferences, possibly with intra-household consumption...

This paper integrates banks into a two-sector neoclassical growth model to account for the fact that a fraction of firms relies on banks to finance their investments. There are four major contributions to the literature. First, although banks' leverage amplifies shocks, the endogenous response...

Bank leverage constraints can emerge from regulatory capital requirements as well as from central bank collateral requirements in reserve lending facilities. While these two channels are usually examined separately, we are able to compare them with the help of a bank money creation model in...

We examine the impact of so-called "Crisis Contracts" on bank managers' risktaking incentives and on the probability of banking crises. Under a Crisis Contract, managers are required to contribute a pre-specified share of their past earnings to finance public rescue funds when a crisis occurs....