costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative, but at the same … naive or delegating receivers; disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of … the information structure under which this effect manifests and show that whenever it does, full disclosure is socially …

costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative, but at the same … delegating receivers; disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of the … information structure under which this effect manifests and show that whenever it does, full disclosure is socially inefficient …

costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative and, at the same … or delegating receivers. Disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of … the information structure under which this effect manifests and show that whenever it does, full disclosure is socially …

costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative, but at the same … naive or delegating receivers; disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of … the information structure under which this effect manifests and show that whenever it does, full disclosure is socially …

costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative and, at the same … or delegating receivers. Disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of … the information structure under which this effect manifests and show that whenever it does, full disclosure is socially …

costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative, but at the same … delegating receivers; disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of the … information structure under which this effect manifests and show that whenever it does, full disclosure is socially inefficient …