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Contractual structure in agriculture with endogenous matching
Ghatak, Maitreesh; Karajvanov, Alexander K. - 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010197114
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Moral hazard and overlapping generations with endugenous occupational choice
Ghatak, Maithreesh - 1997
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000963160
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Occupational choice and dynamic incentives
Ghatak, Maitreesh; Morelli, Massimo; Sjöström, Tomas - In: The review of economic studies 68 (2001) 4, pp. 781-810
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001627794
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Contractual structure and endogenous matching in partnerships
Ghatak, Maitreesh; Karajvanov, Alexander K. - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008856040
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Contractual structure and endogenous matching in partnerships
Ghatak, Maitreesh; Karajvanov, Alexander K. - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008990009
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Contract choice in agriculture with joint moral hazard in effort and risk
Ghatak, Maitreesh; Pandey, Priyanka - In: Journal of development economics 63 (2000) 2, pp. 303-326
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001529947
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Incentives and the De Soto effect
Besley, Timothy; Burchardi, Konrad B.; Ghatak, Maitreesh - In: The quarterly journal of economics 127 (2012) 1, pp. 237-282
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009515939
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Guilt, esteem, and motivational investments
Ghatak, Maitreesh; Wahhaj, Zaki - 2020
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012288323
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Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives
Ghatak, Maitreesh; Morelli, Massimo; Sjöström, Tomas - 2001
We study an overlapping generations version of the principal-agent problem, where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium. All individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Imperfections in the credit market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014147066
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Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives
Ghatak, Maitreesh; Morelli, Massimo; Sjöström, Tomas - 2001
We study an overlapping generations version of the principal-agent problem, where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium. All individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Imperfections in the credit market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014135339