Showing 1 - 10 of 26
Does improving creditor coordination by strengthening CACs lead to efficiency gains in the functioning of sovereign bond markets? We address this question in a model featuring both debtor moral hazard and creditor coordination under incomplete information. Conditional on default, we characterize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010862688
We analyze whether or not the globalization of capital, `disciplines' governments and improves gov- ernance. We demonstrate that globalization a ects governance, by increasing a country's vulnerability to sudden capital ight. This increased threat of capital ight can discipline governments and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010862694
This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of choices in a setting where a decision-maker may not fully internalize all the consequences of her choices on herself. Such a departure from rationality, it turns out, is common across a variety of positive behavioral models and admits the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010862699
Bank crises, by interrupting liquidity provision, have been viewed as resulting in welfare losses. In a model of banking with moral hazard, we show that second best bank contracts that improve on autarky ex-ante require costly crises to occur with positive probability at the interim stage. When...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010862702
Does power sharing between competing elites result in franchise extension to non-elites? In this paper, we argue that competing, risk-averse elites will enfranchise non-elites as in-surance against future, uncertain imbalances in relative bargaining power. We show that negligibly small changes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368619
This paper studies the conditions under which intra-elite conflict leads to a democracy. There are two risk averse elites competing for the appropriation of a unit of social surplus, with an ex-ante uncertainty about their future relative bargaining power, and a large non-elite class unable to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368658
In this paper, we study three prototypical models of noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders : the model of Cournot-Walras equilibrium of Codognato and Gabszewicz (1991), the model of Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Lloyd S. Shapley, and the model of Cournot-Walras...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368715
We provide a model of the links between commercialisation and technological progress, which is consistent with the historical evidence and places market relations at the heart of the industrial revolution. First, commercialisation raised wages as a growing reliance on impersonal labour market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146887
In a model with both issues of sovereign debtor moral hazard and creditor coordination under incomplete information, we show that the resulting conflict between ex ante and interim efficiency limits the welfare impact of strengthening CACs. Conditional on default, we show that an interim...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146937
The Industrial Revolution is often characterized as the culmination of a process of commercialisation ; however, the precise nature of such a link remains unclear. This paper models and analyses one such link: the impact of a higher degree of anonymity of market transactions on relative factor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009386251