preferences that guide such antitrust prosecutions remain understudied. We empirically examine the intertemporal shifts in U ….S. antitrust cartel prosecutions during the period 1969-2013. This period has seen substantive policy innovations with increasing …-2003, and 2004-2013. Our empirical estimates show significant variation in the number of cartels prosecuted and the penalties …

preferences that guide such antitrust prosecutions remain understudied. We empirically examine the intertemporal shifts in U ….S. antitrust cartel prosecutions during the period 1969-2013. This period has seen substantive policy innovations with increasing …-2003, and 2004-2013. Our empirical estimates show significant variation in the number of cartels prosecuted and the penalties …

investigate and prosecute cartels. Currently, in several jurisdictions, information acquired in, for example, a M&A investigation … could be jeopardized if the firms were engaging in collusion, as the likelihood of detection and prosecution would increase … cartels are actually prosecuted via this channel, the proposal has the likelihood of creating a meaningful deterrence effect …

investigate and prosecute cartels. Currently, in several jurisdictions, information acquired in, for example, a M&A investigation … could be jeopardized if the firms were engaging in collusion, as the likelihood of detection and prosecution would increase … cartels are actually prosecuted via this channel, the proposal has the likelihood of creating a meaningful deterrence effect …

This paper focuses on the genesis, taxonomy and timeline of U.S. criminal antitrust investigations, and uses time …

appear to be mixed. We explore the implications of our findings for antitrust analysis. …

This paper focuses on the genesis, taxonomy and timeline of U.S. criminal antitrust investigations, and uses time …