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The paper explores the consequences of SEC detection of illegal insider trading on subsequent insider trading activities. We hypothesize that individuals with private information update their subjective probabilities of getting caught and are less likely to exploit material, non-public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010483308
Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, e.g., by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements were...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291113
Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, for example, by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010308553
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011548654
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011373328
In the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era corporate insiders were required to report trades in shares of their firm until the 10th of the month following the trade. This gave them considerable flexibility to time their trades and reports strategically, e.g., by executing a sequence of trades and reporting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003919398
Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, for example, by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822941
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008935021
Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes–Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, e.g., by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements were...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009405124
Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes–Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, for example, by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009705493