. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which …

cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction …

effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …-price auction. We characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria such that both mechanisms are payoff-equivalent and induce the same efforts … and innovations. In these equilibria, signaling in the entry auction does not occur since contestants play a simple …

. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which …

cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction …

effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …-price auction. We characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria such that both mechanisms are payoff-equivalent and induce the same efforts … and innovations. In these equilibria, signaling in the entry auction does not occur since contestants play a simple …

-price auction. Before the contest, a fixed number of innovators is selected in an entry auction, in order to address the adverse …

effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …-price auction. We characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria such that both mechanisms are payoff-equivalent and induce the same efforts … and innovations. In these equilibria, signaling in the entry auction does not occur since contestants play a simple …

. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more …-part tariffs. The key features are that royalty contracts are auctioned and that losers of the auction are granted the option to …