. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which …

cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction …

cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction …

effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …-price auction. We characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria such that both mechanisms are payoff-equivalent and induce the same efforts … and innovations. In these equilibria, signaling in the entry auction does not occur since contestants play a simple …

. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which …

effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …-price auction. We characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria such that both mechanisms are payoff-equivalent and induce the same efforts … and innovations. In these equilibria, signaling in the entry auction does not occur since contestants play a simple …

rents and thus improve the efficiency of how scarce public funds are allocated. We propose a new open clock auction for this … procurement problem. This auction is strategically simple, as it exhibits truthtelling in dominant strategies and satisfies ex …-post rationality, while observing the budget constraint. We test the auction in Monte-Carlo simulation and discuss its applicability …

-price auction. Before the contest, a fixed number of innovators is selected in an entry auction, in order to address the adverse …

effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …-price auction. We characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria such that both mechanisms are payoff-equivalent and induce the same efforts … and innovations. In these equilibria, signaling in the entry auction does not occur since contestants play a simple …

oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines elements of a license auction with royalty licensing by granting the losers … of the auction the option to sign a royalty contract. The optimal new mechanism eliminates the losses from exclusionary …