In this paper we study how bargainers impact on markets in which firms set a list price to sell to those consumers who take prices as given. The list price acts as an outside option for the bargainers, so the higher the list price, the more the firms can extract from bargainers. We find that an...

In this paper we study price competition between firms when some consumers attempt tobargain while others buy at the public list or posted prices. Even though bargainers succeed innegotiating discounts off the list prices, their presence dampens competitive pressure in the marketby reducing the...

In this paper we investigate how cognitive ability influences behavior, success and theevolution of play towards Nash equilibrium in repeated strategic interactions. We study behaviorin a p-beauty contest experiment and find striking differences according to cognitiveability: more cognitively...

We study price competition between firms over public list or posted prices when a fraction of consumers (termed 'bargainers') can subsequently receive discounts with some probability.  Such stochastic discounts are a feature of markets in which some consumers bargain explicitly; of markets in...

We use an online real-effort experiment to investigate how bonus-based pay and worker productivity interact with workplace cheating.  Firms often use bonus-based compensation plans, such as group bonuses and firm-wide profit sharing, that induce considerable uncertainty in how much workers are...

In this paper we investigate how cognitive ability and character skills influence behavior, success and the evolution of play towards Nash equilibrium in repeated strategic interactions.  We study behavior in a p-beauty contest experiment and find striking differences according to cognitive...

In this note, we present a novel computerized real effort task based on moving sliders across a screen which overcomes many of the drawbacks of existing real effort tasks.  The task was first developed and used by us in Gill and Prowse (2009).  We outline the design of our "slider task",...

We develop a novel computerized real effort task, based on moving sliders across a screen, to test experimentally whether agents are disappointment averse when they compete in a real effort sequential-move tournament.  Our theory predicts that a disappointment averse agent, who is loss averse...

We analyze the incentives to disclose intermediate research results. We find that despite the help that disclosure can give to a rival, the leading innovator sometimes chooses to disclose. Disclosure signals commitment to the research project, which may induce a rival to exit. With weak product...

We develop a model to describe the behavior of agents who care about receiving their just deserts in competitive situations. In particular we analyze the strategic behaviour of two identical desert-motivated agents in a rank-order tournament. Each agent is assumed to be loss averse about an...