Experimental studies have shown that deterrence (monitoring and punishment) can be an effective anti-corruption policy. Even when they themselves stand to lose, policymakers may enact deterrence policies with real teeth ... However, policymakers' legitimacy is crucial: a given deterrence policy...

In our framed laboratory experiment, two Public Officials, A and B, make consecutive decisions regarding embezzlement from separate funds. Official B observes Official A's decision before making their own. There are four treatments: three with deterrence and one without. We find a peer effect in...

We analyse policy makers' incentives to fight corruption under different institutional qualities. We find that 'public officials', even when non-corrupt, significantly distort anti-corruption institutions by choosing a lower detection probability when this probability applies to their own...

Experimental studies have shown that deterrence (monitoring and punishment) can be an effective anti-corruption policy. • Even when they themselves stand to lose, policymakers may enact deterrence policies with real teeth… • … However, policymakers’ legitimacy is crucial: a given...

In our framed laboratory experiment, two Public Officials, A and B, make consecutive decisions regarding embezzlement from separate funds. Official B observes Official A’s decision before making their own. There are four treatments: three with deterrence and one without. We find a peer effect...

We analyse policy makers' incentives to fight corruption under different institutional qualities. We find that 'public officials', even when non-corrupt, significantly distort anti-corruption institutions by choosing a lower detection probability when this probability applies to their own...

The question of why firms and managers engage in corruption and related unethical behaviors has attracted significant academic attention with several authors pointing to the importance of social norms and expectations. In this paper, we ask if “legitimate” administrative costs are less of a...

We designed a public good laboratory experiment in order to identify the causal relationships between tax evasion and corruption and query whether deterring one of these behaviors may have desirable spillover effects on the other. To do so, we analyse the effects of deterrence when the target is...