We provide evidence on optional stock dividends, a mechanism that allows shareholders to choose between stock dividends and cash dividends. We find that, in contrast to dividend cuts, shareholders do not view this option as bad news. They overwhelmingly approve it at general meetings, with the...

Research into the impact of open market share repurchases has been hindered by the lack of data available on actual share repurchases in many countries, including the U.S. Using a previously unaccessed database containing detailed information on 36,848 repurchase days concerning 352 French...

French law mandates that employees of large publicly listed companies be allowed to elect two types of directors to represent employees. First, partially privatized companies must reserve two or three (depending on board size) board seats for directors elected by employees by right of...

We examine the relation between cash holdings, quality of governance and financial constraints. We find that firms with strong shareholder rights hold more cash, contrary to the predictions of agency theory. This result is partly due to the positive correlation that exists between governance...

Research on the impact of open market share repurchases has been hindered by the lack of data available on actual share repurchases in many countries, including the US. Using a previously unused database containing detailed information on 36,848 repurchases made by 352 French firms, we show that...

Research into the impact of open market share repurchases has been hindered by the lack of data available on actual share repurchases in many countries, including the U.S. Using a previously unaccessed database containing detailed information on 36,848 repurchase days concerning 352 French...

This paper examines open market stock repurchases in France. We find an average positive market reaction on the announcement. However, the magnitude of price reaction is found to be dependent on a number of measures of corporate governance structure. The positive aspects of the announcement...

We examine the relation between cash holdings, corporate governance and financial constraints. We find that firms with weak shareholder rights hold less cash, in contrast to the predictions of agency theory. This result is partly due to the positive correlation that exists between shareholder...

French law mandates that employees of publicly listed companies can elect two types of directors to represent employees. Privatized companies must reserve board seats for directors elected by employees by right of employment, while employee-shareholders can elect a director whenever they hold at...

Open market share repurchases are strictly regulated to prevent managers from taking advantage of selling shareholders. We examine compliance with these rules in France, where the mandatory disclosure of share repurchases provides detailed information on repurchases actually undertaken. Using a...