Questo lavoro si propone di distinguere le differenti motivazioni che si trovano alla base delle scelte effettuate in un gioco dell’investimento. In particolare attraverso metodi diretti, basati sull’osservazione dei playoff e delle scelte, e indiretti, basati su questionari, si vogliono...

This paper attempts to measure conditional and unconditional other-regarding preferences in two versions of an investment game: a canonical one and a cheap-talk variant where some pre-play is also allowed (i.e., non-binding unilateral messages). We find that counter-factual measures, as the...

Our paper aims to investigate conditional and unconditional motivations in investment games by using a counterfactual methodology and attitudinal survey and self-reported information about participants’ behavior. We have combined different methodologies to verify the coherence between...

Our paper reconsiders the triadic design proposed by Cox (2004) to identify trust and reciprocity in investment games. Specifically, we extend the design in two directions. First, we elicit expectations by a fixed-fee incentive scheme and test the coherence of them with the triadic outcomes. We...

Our research aims to find out whether meditation has a positive impact on trust and cooperation. By comparing the behavior of agents exposed to meditation before playing an investment game to others not exposed, we find that the formers show more trust on average than the latters. Meditation...

We challenge the widely held belief that New Keynesian models cannot predict an optimal positive inflation rate. In fact we find that even for the US economy, characterized by relatively small government size, optimal trend inflation is justified by the Phelps argument that the inflation tax...

By using the recent Gertler and Kiyotaki's (2010) setup, this paper explores the interaction between real distortions stemming from the labor market institutions and financial shocks. We find that neither labor market imperfections nor fiscal institutions determining tax wedges have an impact on...

Empirical contributions show that wage re-negotiations take place while expiring contracts are still in place. This is captured by assuming that nominal wages are pre-determined. As a consequence, wage setters act as Stackelberg leaders, whereas in the typical New Keynesian model the...

Recent developments in macroeconomics resurrect the view that welfare costs of inflation arise because the latter acts as a tax on money balances. Empirical contributions show that wage re-negotiations take place while expiring contracts are still in place. Bringing these seemingly unrelated...

We challenge the widely held belief that New-Keynesian models cannot predict optimal positive inflation rates. In fact these are justified by the Phelps argument that monetary financing can alleviate the burden of distortionary taxation. We obtain this result because, in contrast with previous...