questions in the context of a trust game by asking participants directly about their notions of cheating. We find that: i) both … parties to a trust exchange have implicit notions of what constitutes cheating even in a context without promises or messages …; ii) these notions are not unique - the vast majority of senders would feel cheated by a negative return on their trust …

Trust beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals and, at the same time, persistent across generations. We investigate … one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that … individuals extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs about the same pool of potential partners - i.e., more …

Trust beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals and, at the same time, persistent across generations. We investigate … one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that … individuals extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs about the same pool of potential partners – i.e., more …

questions in the context of a trust game by asking participants directly about their notions of cheating. We find that: i) both … parties to a trust exchange have implicit notions of what constitutes cheating even in a context without promises or messages …; ii) these notions are not unique – the vast majority of senders would feel cheated by a negative return on their trust …

We establish an inverse relationship between family ties, generalized trust and political participation. The more … political participation. The latter, together with trust, are part of what is known as social capital, therefore in this paper …

A vast literature has investigated the relationship between trust and aggregate economic performance. We investigate … the relationship between individual trust and individual economic performance. We find that individual income is hump …-shaped in a measure of intensity of trust beliefs available in the European Social Survey. We show that heterogeneity of trust …

We investigate the relationship between individual trust and individual economic performance. We find that individual … income is hump-shaped in a measure of intensity of trust beliefs. Heterogeneity of trust beliefs in the population, coupled … cheated, but give up profitable opportunities, therefore underperforming. The cost of either too much or too little trust is …

We investigate the relationship between individual trust and individual economic performance. We find that individual … income is hump-shaped in a measure of intensity of trust beliefs. Heterogeneity of trust beliefs in the population, coupled … cheated, but give up profitable opportunities, therefore underperforming. The cost of either too much or too little trust is …

questions in the context of a trust game by asking participants directly about their notions of cheating. We find that: i) both … parties to a trust exchange have implicit notions of what constitutes cheating even in a context without promises or messages …; ii) these notions are not unique - the vast majority of senders would feel cheated by a negative return on their trust …

Trust beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals and, at the same time, persistent across generations. We investigate … one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that … individuals extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs about the same pool of potential partners - i.e., more …