We analyze strategic speculators' incentives to trade on information in a model where firm value is endogenous to trading, due to feedback from the financial market to corporate decisions. Trading reveals private information to managers and improves their real decisions, enhancing fundamental...

This paper identifies a limit to arbitrage that arises from the fact that a firm's fundamental value is endogenous to the act of exploiting the arbitrage. Trading on private information reveals this information to managers and helps them improve their real decisions, in turn enhancing...

We study how commodity financialization affects information transmission in a commodity futures market. The trading of financial traders injects both information and noise into the futures price. In consequence, price informativeness in the futures market first increases and then decreases with...

This paper identifies a limit to arbitrage that arises from the fact that a firm's fundamental value is endogenous to the act of exploiting the arbitrage. Trading on private information reveals this information to managers and helps them improve their real decisions, in turn enhancing...

This paper studies information sharing between strategic investors who are privately informed about asset fundamental with different precision levels. We find that a coarsely informed investor would always share her information “as is” if her counterparty investor is well informed about the...