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We define coherent-ambiguity aversion within the Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) smooth ambiguity model (henceforth KMM) as the combination of choice-ambiguity aversion and value-ambiguity aversion. We analyze theoretically five ambiguous decision tasks, where a subject faces two-stage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014165098
We define coherent-ambiguity aversion within the Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) smooth ambiguity model (henceforth KMM) as the combination of choice-ambiguity aversion and value-ambiguity aversion. We analyze theoretically five ambiguous decision tasks, where a subject faces two-stage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010578074
We define coherent-ambiguity aversion within the Klibano¤, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) smooth ambiguity model (henceforth KMM) as the combination of choice-ambiguity aversion and value-ambiguity aversion. We analyze theoretically ?ve ambiguous decision tasks, where a subject faces two-stage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011103548
This paper develops an adverse selection model where peer group systems are shown to trigger lower interest rates and remove credit rationing in the case where borrowers are uninformed about their potential partners and ex post state verification (or auditing) by banks is costly. Peer group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774796
We characterize the competitive equilibrium on the credit market when borrowers can strategically default. We assume that the audit is subject of errors of the two types and that lenders cannot commit ex-ante. We determine the penalty, the loan rate, the audit and strategic default...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706866
We characterize the competitive equilibrium on the credit market when borrowers can strategically default. We assume that the audit is subject of errors of the two types and that lenders cannot commit ex-ante. We determine the penalty, the loan rate, the audit and strategic default...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009149992
We characterize the competitive equilibrium on the credit market when borrowers can strategically default. We assume that the audit is subject of errors of the two types and that lenders cannot commit ex-ante. We determine the penalty, the loan rate, the audit and strategic default...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009131125
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000882086
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000827879
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000837537