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This paper studies strategic information transmission in a dynamic environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision maker takes an action. Our main result is that, in contrast to a static environment, full information revelation is possible. The gradual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013124963
This paper studies strategic information transmission in a finite-horizon environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision-maker takes an action. Our main contribution is to show that communication in this dynamic environment is drastically different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013090512
This paper studies strategic information transmission in a finite horizon environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision-maker takes an action. We show that communication in this dynamic environment is drastically different from in a one-shot game. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013092285
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010903532
This paper studies strategic information transmission in a dynamic environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision maker takes an action. Our main result is that, in contrast to a static environment, full information revelation is possible. The gradual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009391747
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010832921
This paper studies strategic information transmission in a dynamic environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision maker takes an action. Our main result is that, in contrast to a static environment, full information revelation is possible. The gradual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009019140
This paper studies dynamic non-linear taxation in a two-period model without government commitment and a continuum of agents with privately known skill parameters, which are constant overtime. The government is utilitarian but cannot commit at t=1 to the tax scheme that she will propose at t=2....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085448
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287503
We develop a dynamic theory of resource wars and study the conditions under which such wars can be prevented. The interaction between the scarcity of resources and the incentives for war in the presence of limited commitment is at the center of our theory. We show that a key parameter...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013131444