Showing 1 - 10 of 13
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378596
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011486976
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011665343
In cooperative games, the core is one of the most popular solution concept since it ensures coalitional rationality. For non-balanced games however, the core is empty, and other solution concepts have to be found. We propose the use of general solutions, that is, to distribute the total worth of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010641780
We consider in this paper solutions for TU-games where it is not assumed that the grand coalition is necessarily the final state of cooperation. Partitions of the grand coalition, or balanced collections together with a system of balancing weights interpreted as a time allocation vector are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010791258
In cooperative games, the core is one of the most popular solution concept since it ensures coalitional rationality. For non-balanced games however, the core is empty, and other solution concepts have to be found. We propose the use of general solutions, that is, to distribute the total worth of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010775790
The paper proposes a new concept of solution for TU games, called multicoalitional solution, which makes sense in the context of production games, that is, where v(S) is the production or income per unit of time. By contrast to classical solutions where elements of the solution are payoff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010703382
In cooperative games, the core is one of the most popular solution concept since it ensures coalitional rationality. For non-balanced games however, the core is empty, and other solution concepts have to be found. We propose the use of general solutions, that is, to distribute the total worth of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010711847
The paper proposes a new concept of solution for TU games, called multicoalitional solution, which makes sense in the context of production games, that is, where v(S) is the production or income per unit of time. By contrast to classical solutions where elements of the solution are payoff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010898350
We consider in this paper solutions for TU-games where it is not assumed that the grand coalition is necessarily the final state of cooperation. Partitions of the grand coalition, or balanced collections together with a system of balancing weights interpreted as a time allocation vector are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010898385