<Para ID="Par1">We introduce a “nestedness” relation for a general class of sender–receiver games and compare equilibrium properties, in particular the amount of information transmitted, across games that are nested. Roughly, game <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$B$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>B</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> is nested in game <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$A$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>A</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> if the players’ optimal...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></para>

We introduce a “nestedness” relation for a general class of sender-receiver games and compare equilibrium properties, in particular the amount of information transmitted, across games that are nested. Roughly, game is nested in game if the players’s optimal actions are closer in game. We...

We introduce a “nestedness” relation for a general class of sender-receiver games and compare equilibrium properties, in particular the amount of information transmitted, across games that are nested. Roughly, game is nested in game if the players’s optimal actions are closer in game. We...

We introduce a "nestedness" relation for a general class of sender-receiver games and compare equilibrium properties, in particular the amount of information transmitted, across games that are nested. Roughly, game B is nested in game A if the players’s optimal actions are closer in game B. We...