This paper develops a simple model to examine the interaction between partner choice and individual behavior in games of coordination. An important ingredient of our approach is the way we model partner choice: we suppose that a player can establish ties with other players by unilaterally...

This paper develops a simple model to examine the interaction between partner choice and individual behavior in games of coordination. An important ingredient of our approach is the way we model partner choice: We suppose that a player can establish ties with other players by unilaterally...

We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collaboration: bilateral agreements and nonexclusive relationships. Our analysis highlights the relationship between market competition, firms' incentives to invest in R&D, and the architecture of...

In many economic and social contexts, individual players choose their partners and also decide ona mode of behavior in interactions with these partners. This paper develops a simple model toexamine the interaction between partner choice and individual behavior in games of coordination.An...

In an oligopoly, prior to competing in the market, firms have an opportunity to form pair-wisecollaborative links with other firms. These pair-wise links involve a commitment of resources andlead to lower costs of production of the collaborating firms. The collection of pair-wise linksdefines a...