In strictly competitive games, equilibrium mixed strategies are invariant to changes in the ultimate prizes. Dixit & Skeath (1999) argue that this seems counter-intuitive. We show that this invariance is robust to dropping the independence axiom, but is removed if we drop the reduction axiom.

Existing models of corporate "short-termism" rely on an exogenously imposed, suboptimal management objective function. This paper endogenizes both managers' concern for short-term stock prices and the resulting distorsions. We consider a standard agency problem between corporate managers and...

What is the relationship between an agent's attitude towards information, and her attitude towards risk? if an agent always prefers more information does this imply that she obyes the independence axiom? We provide a substitution property on preferences that is equivalent to the agent...

This paper analyzes the optimal use of short and long-term share prices in management incentive contracts. A key innovation of our model is that the short-term share price is determined even before the manager has made her effort choice and therefore cannot be informative in the standard...

Any meaningful reform of the US Social Security system must deal with the system's current outstanding accumulated unfunded liabilities. The authors model these as a once-off financial liability payable 'tomorrow'. They show that if the equity premium puzzle arises from adverse selection...

We present a definition of increasing uncertainty, independent of any notion of subjective probabilities, or of any particular model of preferences.Our notion of an elementary increase in the uncertainty of any act corresponds to the addition of an 'elementary bet' which increases consumption by...