The Precautionary Principle has been proposed as a basis for making decisions about environmental issues but remains controversial. Using a model of inductively justified propositions about awareness, this paper shows how the Precautionary Principle may be interpreted as a heuristic guide for...

The idea of representing choice under uncertainty as a trade-off between mean returns and some measure of risk or uncertainty is fundamental to the analysis of investment decisions. In this paper, we show that preferences can be characterized in this way, even in the absence of objective...

We axiomatize, in an Anscombe–Aumann framework, the class of preferences that admit a representation of the form V(f)=μ−ρ(d), where μ is the mean utility of the act f with respect to a given probability, d is the vector of state-by-state utility deviations from the mean, and ρ(d) is a...

This paper shows that, for CEU preferences, the axioms consquentialism, state independence and conditional certainty equivalent consistency under updating characterise a family of capacities, called Genralised Neo-Additive Capacities (GNAC). This family contains as special cases among others...

We axiomatize, in an Anscombe-Aumann framework, the class of preferences that admit a representation of the form V(f) = mu - rho(d), where mu is the mean utility of the act f with respect to a given probability, d is the vector of state-by-state utility deviations from the mean, and rho(d) is a...

In Ghirardato, Macheroni and MArcinaccri (GMM) propose a method for distinguishing between percieved ambiguity and the decision-maker's reaction to it. They study a general class of preferences which includes CEU and a-MEU and axiomatise a subclass of a-MEU preferences. We show that for Hurwicz...

In [7] Ghirardato, Macheroni and Marinacci (GMM) propose a method for distinguishing between perceived ambiguity and the decision-maker's reaction to it. They study a general class of preferences which they refer to as invariant biseparable. This class includes CEU and MEU. They axiomatize a...

We apply Pires’s coherence property between unconditional and conditional preferences that admit a CEU representation. In conjunction with consequentialism (only those outcomes on states which are still possible can matter for conditional preference) this implies that the conditional...

Raiffa (1961) has suggested that ambiguity aversion will cause a strict preference for randomization. We show that dynamic consistency implies that individuals will be indifferent to ex ante randomizations. On the other hand, it is possible for a dynamically-consistent ambiguity averse...

We present a definition of increasing uncertainty, in which an elementary increase in the uncertainty of any act corresponds to the addition of an `elementary bet' that increases consumption by a fixed amount in (relatively) `good' states and decreases consumption by a fixed (and possibly...