We present a definition of increasing uncertainty, in which an elementary increase in the uncertainty of any act corresponds to the addition of an `elementary bet' that increases consumption by a fixed amount in (relatively) `good' states and decreases consumption by a fixed (and possibly...

Building upon the works of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) and Karni and Schmeidler (1981), we develop a general axiomatic theory of quantifiable beliefs - a form of probabilistic sophistication that does not preclude state-dependent preferences and does not require the reduction of compound...

This paper characterizes a family of preference relations over uncertain prospects that (i) are dynamically consistent in the Machina sense and, moreover, for which the updated preferences are also members of this family and (ii) can simultaneously accommodate Ellsberg and Allais type paradoxes....

We compare the Skiadas approach with the standard Savage framework of choice under uncertainty. At first glance, properties of Skiadas "conditional preferences" such as coherence and disappointment seem analogous to similarly motivated notions of decomposability and disappointment aversion...

We characterize the intersection of the probabilistically sophisticated and multiple prior models. We show this class is strictly larger than the subjective expected utility model and that its elements can be generated from a generalized class of the -contaminated priors, which we dub the -...

The concept of a non-extreme-outcome-additive capacity (neo-additive capacity ) is introduced. Neo-additive capacities model optimistic and pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty as observed in many experimental studies. Moreover, neo-additive capacities can be applied easily in economic...

Machina & Schmeidler (1992) show that probabilistic sophistication can be obtained in a Savage setting without imposing expected utility by dropping Savage's axiom P2 (sure-thing principle) and strengthening his axiom P4 (weak comparative probability). Their stronger axiom, however, embodies a...

The idea of representing choice under uncertainty as a trade-off between mean returns and some measure of risk or uncertainty is fundamental to the analysis of investment decisions. In this paper, we show that preferences can be characterized in this way, even in the absence of objective...

The Precautionary Principle has been proposed as a basis for making decisions about environmental issues but remains controversial. Using a model of inductively justified propositions about awareness, this paper shows how the Precautionary Principle may be interpreted as a heuristic guide for...

We apply Pires’s coherence property between unconditional and conditional preferences that admit a CEU representation. In conjunction with consequentialism (only those outcomes on states which are still possible can matter for conditional preference) this implies that the conditional...