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Implementing efficient market structure
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000
This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310273
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The third generation (UMTS) spectrum auction in Germany
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2001
competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310407
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Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions : the GSM spectrum auction in Germany
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2001
market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation of low price equilibria in simultaneous, ascending-bid auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011399147
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The third generation (UMTS) spectrum auction in Germany
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2001
competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400807
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The third generation (UMTS) spectrum auction in Germany
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2001
competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and … was predominantly employed in Europe. -- auctions ; telecommunications ; industrial organization ; game theory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009615427
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The Third Generation (Umts) Spectrum Auction in Germany
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2021
competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320762
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The third generation (UMTS) spectrum auction in Germany
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 2001
competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956370
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Implementing efficient market structure
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 2000
This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956424
Cover Image
Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: The GSM spectrum auction in Germany
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2001
market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation of low price equilibria in simultaneous, ascending-bid auctions. In …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310422
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Implementing efficient market structure
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000
that these mechanisms generally avoid budget deficits and prevent excessive entry. -- auctions ; mechanism design ; natural …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583432