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Sequential versus bundle auctions for recurring procurement

Grimm, Veronika - In: Journal of economics 90 (2007) 1, pp. 1-27

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003416837

Three essays on mechanism design and multi-object auctions

Grimm, Veronika - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001738088

Auktionen : zu viel oder zu wenig geboten?

Grimm, Veronika; Schmidt, Ulrich; Weber, Martin - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003467104

Division into lots and competition in procurement

Grimm, Veronika; Pacini, Riccardo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo; … - In: Handbook of procurement, (pp. 168-192). 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003409970

Division in Lots and Competition in Procurement

Grimm, Veronika; Pacini, Riccardo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo; … - 2006

market structure and procurement design. We discuss the relationship between the number of lots, participation, competition …, and potential collusion in competitive procurement, and propose two simple indices that allow to evaluate how competition … the level of competition in the long run. We discuss how current procurement design may affect entry and exit of firms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058808

Equilibrium bidding without the independence axiom : a graphical analysis

Grimm, Veronika; Schmidt, Ulrich - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001390733

Implementing efficient market structure

Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clark-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781544

Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions : the GSM spectrum auction in Germany

Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2001

The second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction.The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011399147

The third generation (UMTS) spectrum auction in Germany

Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2001

The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same time achieved a more competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and presents a game theoretic explanation of observed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400807

Bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions : an experimental investigation and some theoretical insights

Engelmann, Dirk; Grimm, Veronika - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001818307