This paper outlines how the theory of contests is applied to professional team sports leagues. In the first part, we present the traditional Tullock contest and explain some basic properties of the equilibrium. We will then extend this RePEc/rsd contest to a two-period model in order to analyze...

This paper outlines how the theory of contests is applied to professional team sports leagues. In the first part, we present the traditional Tullock contest and explain some basic properties of the equilibrium. We will then extend this static contest to a two-period model in order to analyze...

This paper outlines how the theory of contests is applied to professional team sports leagues. In the first part, we present the traditional Tullock contest and explain some basic properties of the equilibrium. We will then extend this RePEc/iso contest to a two-period model in order to analyze...

type="main" xml:id="sjpe12060-abs-0001" <title type="main">Abstract</title> <p>This paper analyzes spillover effects in sports leagues that are embedded in a system of promotion and relegation. Based on a contest model of a professional sports league with a top division and a second division, we show that league prizes and...</p>

Bonus taxes have been implemented to prevent managers from taking excessive risks. This paper analyzes the effects of taxing executives' bonuses in a principal--agent model. Our model shows that, contrary to its intention, the introduction of a bonus tax intensifies managers' risk-taking...

This paper develops a contest model of a professional sports league in which clubs maximize a weighted sum of profits and wins (utility maximization). The model analyzes how more win-orientated behavior of certain clubs affects talent investments, competitive balance and club profits. Moreover,...

Several countries have implemented bonus taxes for corporate executives in response to the financial crisis of 2007-2010. Using a principal-agent model, this paper investigates the incentive effects of bonus taxes by analyzing the agent's and principal's behavior. Specifically, we show how bonus...