We empirically examine standard agency predictions about how performance measures are optimally weighted to provide CEO incentives. Consistent with prior empirical research, we document that the relative weight on price and non-price performance measures in CEO cash pay is a decreasing function...

A growing body of literature suggests that because an executive is risk-averse and undiversified, he values equity compensation and incentives at less than market value. This discount on valuation is driven by the assumption that the executive is constrained from rebalancing his portfolio...

We examine whether publicly available performance measures other than stock price are economically significant in explaining changes in CEOs' firm-specific wealth. Similar to Antle and Smith [1986], we measure a CEO's firm-specific wealth changes as the sum of total annual pay and changes in the...

We empirically examine standard agency predictions about how performance measures are optimally weighted to provide CEO incentives. Consistent with prior empirical research, we document that the relative weight on price and non-price performance measures in CEO cash pay is a decreasing function...

The appropriateness of rules governing the financial reporting of derivatives securities depends critically on corporations' intended purpose for holding these instruments. Empirically, however, little is known about how these instruments impact firms' risk-exposures. This study examines the...

We evaluate the influence of measurement error in analysts' forecasts on the accuracy of implied cost of capital estimates from various implementations of the 'implied cost of capital' approach, and develop corrections for the measurement error. The implied cost of capital approach relies on...

We re-examine the claim that many corporations are underleveraged in that they fail to take full advantage of debt tax shields. We show prior results suggesting underleverage stems from biased estimates of tax benefits from interest deductions. We develop improved estimates of marginal tax rates...

We examine the press' role in monitoring and influencing executive compensation practice using more than 11,000 press articles about CEO compensation from 1994 to 2002. Negative press coverage is more strongly related to excess annual pay than to raw annual pay, suggesting a sophisticated...

Stock and option compensation and the level of managerial equity incentives are aspects of corporate governance that are especially controversial to shareholders, institutional activists, and governmental regulators. Similar to much of the corporate finance and corporate governance literature,...