We empirically examine standard agency predictions about how performance measures are optimally weighted to provide CEO incentives. Consistent with prior empirical research, we document that the relative weight on price and non-price performance measures in CEO cash pay is a decreasing function...

The appropriateness of rules governing the financial reporting of derivatives securities depends critically on corporations' intended purpose for holding these instruments. Empirically, however, little is known about how these instruments impact firms' risk-exposures. This study examines the...

We evaluate the influence of measurement error in analysts' forecasts on the accuracy of implied cost of capital estimates from various implementations of the 'implied cost of capital' approach, and develop corrections for the measurement error. The implied cost of capital approach relies on...

We re-examine the claim that many corporations are underleveraged in that they fail to take full advantage of debt tax shields. We show prior results suggesting underleverage stems from biased estimates of tax benefits from interest deductions. We develop improved estimates of marginal tax rates...

We examine the press' role in monitoring and influencing executive compensation practice using more than 11,000 press articles about CEO compensation from 1994 to 2002. Negative press coverage is more strongly related to excess annual pay than to raw annual pay, suggesting a sophisticated...

A growing body of literature suggests that because risk-averse executives are undiversified, they value equity compensation at significantly less (over 30%) than market value. This valuation discount is driven by the assumptions that the firm ignores existing incentives when it grants equity,...

We examine how corporations' exposures to interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity prices are related to investors' and analysts' expectations about firms' earnings. The results indicate that investors and analysts encounter difficulties estimating the earnings effects of the risk exposures...

We empirically examine standard agency predictions about how performance measures are optimally weighted to provide CEO incentives. Consistent with prior empirical research, we document that the relative weight on price and non-price performance measures in CEO cash pay is a decreasing function...

Stock and option compensation and the level of managerial equity incentives are aspects of corporate governance that are especially controversial to shareholders, institutional activists, and governmental regulators. Similar to much of the corporate finance and corporate governance literature,...