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On symmetry in the formation of stable partnerships
Gudmundsson, Jens - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2011
In this note, we examine the connection between the roommate model and the partnership formation model (Talman and Yang, 2011, Journal of Mathematical Economics 47, 206-212). Upon noting that both occasionally lack equilibria we look at the stable partnerships model, a combination of the former...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009325845
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Assignment Games with Externalities
Gudmundsson, Jens; Habis, Helga - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2013
regarding the others' reaction following a deviation. The relationship of stability and optimality is also discussed, as is the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734770
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Sequences in Pairing Problems: A New Approach to Reconcile Stability with Strategy-Proofness for Elementary Matching Problems
Gudmundsson, Jens - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2014
stronger incentive properties are incompatible with much weaker stability properties and vice versa. The CR rule satisfies two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011079258
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On symmetry in the formation of stable partnerships
Gudmundsson, Jens - 2011
In this note, we examine the connection between the roommate model and the partnership formation model (Talman and Yang, 2011, Journal of Mathematical Economics 47, 206-212). Upon noting that both occasionally lack equilibria we look at the stable partnerships model, a combination of the former...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208589
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Assignment Games with Externalities
Gudmundsson, Jens; Habis, Helga - 2013
regarding the others' reaction following a deviation. The relationship of stability and optimality is also discussed, as is the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208655
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Sequences in Pairing Problems: A New Approach to Reconcile Stability with Strategy-Proofness for Elementary Matching Problems
Gudmundsson, Jens - 2014
stronger incentive properties are incompatible with much weaker stability properties and vice versa. The CR rule satisfies two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208707
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Compromises and Rewards: Stable and Non-manipulable Probabilistic Matching
Gudmundsson, Jens - 2017
Can we reconcile stability with non-manipulability in two-sided matching problems by selecting lotteries over matchings … corresponding notions of ex-ante stability and non-manipulability. For most sets, the properties are incompatible. However, for the … set of utility functions with increasing differences, stability and non-manipulability characterize Compromises and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208741
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Compromises and Rewards : stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
Gudmundsson, Jens - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 48 (2019) 2, pp. 365-392
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012062033
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Assignment games with externalities revisited
Gudmundsson, Jens; Habis, Helga - In: Economic theory bulletin 5 (2017) 2, pp. 247-257
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011833768