A group of heterogeneous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have...

We present a polynomial time method for identifying the maximal set in excess demand at a given payoff vector. This set can be used in "large" partnership formation problems to identify the minimum element in the set of individually rational payoff vectors at which there is no overdemanded set...

A group of heterogenous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have...

A group of heterogeneous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have...

A group of heterogeneous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have...

We present a polynomial time method for identifying the maximal set in excess demand at a given payoff vector. This set can be used in "large" partnership formation problems to identify the minimum element in the set of individually rational payoff vectors at which there is no overdemanded set...