Similar Search Results

Butler, Jeffrey V.; Giuliano, Paola; Guiso, Luigi - 2012

Trust beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals and, at the same time, persistent across generations. We investigate … one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that … individuals extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs about the same pool of potential partners - i.e., more …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010289911

Affinity, trust, and information

Guiso, Luigi; Makarin, Alexey - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012301061

Affinity, trust, and information

Guiso, Luigi; Makarin, Alexey - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012615909

Topologies on types

Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen - 2006

We de.ne and analyze a strategic topology on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a .xed game and action de.ne the distance be-tween a pair of types as the diþerence between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272319

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - 2011

We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. We completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014175012

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - 2011

We define a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information in a general setting with finite players, finite actions, and finite states, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. The set of Bayes correlated equilibria of a fixed incomplete information game equals the set...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014176751

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - 2011

We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for all possible private information structures that the agents may have. Our characterization of these robust predictions relies on an epistemic result which establishes a relationship between the set...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014177259

A Foundation for Markoiv Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

Bhaskar, V.; Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 2009

We study perfect information games with an infinite horizon played by an arbitrary number of players. This class of games includes infinitely repeated perfect information games, repeated games with asynchronous moves, games with long and short run players, games with overlapping generations of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204654

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - 2013

The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may or may not have access to more private information is characterized and shown to be equivalent to the set of an incomplete information version of correlated equilibrium, which we call...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014153613

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games : Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - 2013

We define and characterize a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium: The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014153614