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Butler, Jeffrey V.; Giuliano, Paola; Guiso, Luigi - 2012

Trust beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals and, at the same time, persistent across generations. We investigate … one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that … individuals extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs about the same pool of potential partners - i.e., more …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010289911

Topologies on types

Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen - 2006

We de.ne and analyze a strategic topology on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a .xed game and action de.ne the distance be-tween a pair of types as the diþerence between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272319

Topologies on types

Dekel-Tabak, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 3, pp. 275-309

We define and analyze a "strategic topology'' on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a fixed game and action define the distance between a pair of types as the difference...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703019

Topologies on types

Dekel-Tabak, Eddie (contributor); … - 2006 - rev.

We define and analyze a "strategic topology" on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a fixed game and action define the distance between a pair of types as the difference...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003780874

A Foundation for Markoiv Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

Bhaskar, V.; Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 2009

We study perfect information games with an infinite horizon played by an arbitrary number of players. This class of games includes infinitely repeated perfect information games, repeated games with asynchronous moves, games with long and short run players, games with overlapping generations of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204654

Computation of the Nash Equilibrium Selected by the Tracing Procedure in N-Person Games

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; van den Elzen, Antoon H. - 1998

Harsanyi and Selten (1988) have proposed a theory of equilibrium selection that selects a unique Nash equilibrium for any non-cooperative N-person game. The heart of their theory is given by the tracing procedure, a mathematical construction that adjusts arbitrary prior beliefs into equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014208855

An Interior-Point Path-Following Method to Compute Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques - 2020

Subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies (SSPE) is the most important solution concept used in applications of stochastic games, which makes it imperative to develop efficient numerical methods to compute an SSPE. For this purpose, this paper develops an interior-point path-following...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012840979

Information Design : A Unified Perspective

Bergemann, Dirk - 2018

Given a game with uncertain payoffs, information design analyzes the extent to which the provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012924207

Crises : Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks

Morris, Stephen - 2019

We study the informational events that trigger equilibrium shifts in coordination games with incomplete information. Assuming that the distribution of the changes in fundamentals has fat tails, we show that majority play shifts either if fundamentals reach a critical threshold or if there are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892827

Individual Upper Semicontinuity and Subgame Perfect ϵ-Equilibria in Games with Almost Perfect Information

Flesch, János - 2019

We study games with almost perfect information and an infinite time horizon. In such games, at each stage, the players simultaneously choose actions from finite action sets, knowing the actions chosen at all previous stages. The payoff of each player is a function of all actions chosen during...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012894605