This paper analyzes the interaction between the success of group lending institutions and the stock of social capital (modeled by the level of trust) in the community where the group lending programs are located. Agents play a finitely repeated "trust game" in parallel with a finitely repeated...

This paper develops a two-sector overlapping generations (OLG) model of the co-evolution of urbanization, saving, and fertility in developing economies. Children are viewed as a means of old-age support, particularly in the rural sector, as well as a good valued for its own sake. It is shown...

This paper surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on group lending programs in developing countries, with a focus on the determinants of repayment performance.

This paper revisits the conventional wisdom on the determinants of the success of microcredit programs. The paper first develops a simple moral hazard model of borrowing in a group lending context, and then tests this model using data from a survey conducted in Bangladesh in 1991-92. One of the...

This paper develops a model of the strategic interaction of borrowers in the framework of group lending, in an environment characterized by moral hazard. Unlike previous papers, monitoring by one group member of his or her peers is not a crucial feature of the model. Even without monitoring,...

This note reconsiders a theoretical result asserted to explain the success of group lending programs in LDCs. It has been claimed that if groups are allowed to form themselves, risky and safe borrowers will sort themselves into relatively homogenous groups. This "positive assortative matching"...

This paper contributes to the literature on endogenous preferences by showing that, when income is close to the minimum required for subsistence, individuals rationally will behave as if they were risk averse. It is suggested that observed risk aversion in empirical studies can be explained by...