fixed number of schools to be acceptable. We focus on the stability and efficiency of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our … main results identify rather stringent necessary and sufficient conditions on the priorities to guarantee stability or …

not well known in France. We show that the procedure satisfies desirable properties of stability and optimality. In order …

not well known in France. We show that the procedure satisfies desirable properties of stability and optimality. In order …

not well known in France. We show that the procedure satisfies desirable properties of stability and optimality. In order …

fixed number of schools to be acceptable. We focus on the stability and efficiency of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our … main results identify rather stringent necessary and sufficient conditions on the priorities to guarantee stability or …

. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the …

. We characterize the class of TU-games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, which turns out to be …

. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the …

. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the …

games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, and show that this class is much larger than that of …