moral hazard model in which the bank's incentive to mitigate political risk is highest with a non-recourse project finance …

are better able to evaluate a project's risk than entrepreneurs. We study the bank's choice between screening and … collateralization in a model where banks do not have this superior screening skill. In particular, we study the effect of bank … competition on this choice. We find that competing banks use collateral less often than a monopolistic bank because competition …

are better able to evaluate a project's risk than entrepreneurs. We study the bank's choice between screening and … collateralization in a model where banks do not have this superior screening skill. In particular, we study the effect of bank … competition on this choice. We find that competing banks use collateral less often than a monopolistic bank because competition …

The effects of bank competition and institutions on credit markets are usually studied separately although both factors … are interdependent. We study the effect of bank competition on the choice of contracts (screening versus collateralized … effects of bank competition on collateralization, access to finance, and social welfare depend on the institutional …

The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank …-firm relationship and show that the bank's decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank gets a payoff if a …

Policy makers often decide to liberalize foreign bank entry but at the same time restrict the mode of entry. We study …

We study how firms' individual credit market experience influences their beliefs about the bank lending policy, using …

This paper analyzes the effect of the removal of government guarantees on bank risk taking. We exploit the removal of …

This paper analyzes the effect of the removal of government guarantees on bank risk taking. We exploit the removal of …

This paper analyzes the effect of the removal of government guarantees on bank risk taking. We exploit the removal of …