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Banks without Parachutes : Competitive Effects of Government Bail-out Policies
Hakenes, Hendrik; Schnabel, Isabel - 2004
-out guarantee. The reason is that the prospect of a bail-out induces the protected bank to expand, thereby intensifying competition … in the deposit market and depressing other banks? margins. In contrast, the effects on the protected bank?s risk …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261478
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Bank size and risk-taking under Basel II
Hakenes, Hendrik; Schnabel, Isabel - 2005
This paper discusses the relationship between bank size and risk-taking under Pillar I of the New Basel Capital Accord …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264763
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Credit risk transfer and bank competition
Hakenes, Hendrik; Schnabel, Isabel - 2009
transfer ; credit derivatives ; public and private information ; access to credit ; bank competition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003883661
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Competition, risk-shifting, and public bail-out policies
Gropp, Reint; Hakenes, Hendrik; Schnabel, Isabel - 2010
competitor banks for any given bank, and analyze the impact of this variable on banks’ risk-taking behavior, using a large sample … bank bail-outs on banks' risk-taking behavior. -- Government bail-out ; implicit and explicit government guarantees …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003923903
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Banks without parachutes : competitive effects of government bail-out policies
Hakenes, Hendrik; Schnabel, Isabel - 2004 - First Version: November 12, 2003, This Version: June 16, 2004
-out guarantee. The reason is that the prospect of a bail-out induces the rotected bank to expand, thereby intensifying competition … in the deposit market and depressing other banks' margins. In contrast, the effects on the protected bank's risk taking …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361991
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Bank size and risk-taking under Basel II
Hakenes, Hendrik; Schnabel, Isabel - 2006
We analyze the relationship between bank size and risk-taking under the New Basel Capital Accord. Using a model with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366524
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I spy with my little eye... a banking crisis : early warnings and incentive schemes in banks
Hakenes, Hendrik; Schlegel, Friederike - 2014
incentives to implement such a trigger? We construct a theoretical model of a bank that is financed with debt and equity, and a … bank manager monitoring the bank’s loan portfolio. The manager must be incentivized to warn the board before a crisis …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010467356
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Competition, Risk-Shifting, and Public Bail-Out Policies
Gropp, Reint; Hakenes, Hendrik; Schnabel, Isabel - 2010
competitor banks for any given bank, and analyze the impact of this variable on banks’ risk-taking behavior, using a large sample … bank bail-outs on banks’ risk-taking behavior …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014198615
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Competition, Risk-Shifting, and Public Bail-Out Policies
Gropp, Reint - 2010
competitor banks for any given bank, and analyze the impact of this variable on banks' risk-taking behavior, using a large sample … increase the protected banks' risk-taking. These results have important implications for the effects of the recent wave of bank …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013152365
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Credit Risk Transfer and Bank Competition
Hakenes, Hendrik - 2009
We present a banking model with imperfect competition in which borrowers' access to credit is improved when banks are able to transfer credit risks. However, the market for credit risk transfer (CRT) works smoothly only if the quality of loans is public information. If the quality of loans is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013155071