In a model of strategic network formation, the endogenously formed network is built around a pre-existing network. We envisage that the pre-existing or core network is publicly provided. Strategic network formation is decentralized: Players act in their private interest and bear the costs when...

We present a variant of a general equilibrium model with group formation to study how changes of non-consumptive beneï¬ts from group formation impact on the well-being of group members. We identify a human relations paradox: Positive externalities increase, but none of the group members gains...

First a non-cooperative model of network formation is investigated where link formation is one-sided and information flow is two-way. For that model, the relationship between different notions of efficient networks is studied: Pareto optimal networks on the one hand and welfare maximizing...

We consider competitive markets for multiple commodities with endogenous formation of one- or two-person households. Within each two-person household, externalities from the partner’s commodity consumption and unpriced actions are allowed. Each individual has two types of traits:...

The present paper examines zero-sum games that are based on a cyclic preference relation defined over anonymous actions. For each of these games, the set of Nash equilibria is characterized. When the number of actions is odd, a unique Nash equilibrium is always obtained. On the other hand, in...

We outline the basic method of analysis, similar to Judd (1985), that allows to show that for the paths of a continuum of independent — not necessarily i.i.d. — random variables certain properties can be assumed. In particular, we find that the assumption of a continuum of...