Scheduling jobs of decentralized decision makers that are in competition will usually lead to cost inefficiencies. This cost inefficiency is studied using the Price of Anarchy (PoA), i.e., the ratio between the worst Nash equilibrium cost and the cost attained at the centralized optimum. First,...

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining...

Neighbor games arise from certain matching or sequencing situations in which only some specific pairs of players can obtain a positive gain. As a consequence, the class of neighbor games is the intersection of the class of assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1972)) and the class of component...

Neighbor games arise from certain matching or sequencing situations in which only some specific pairs of players can obtain a positive gain. As a consequence, the class of neighbor games is the intersection of the class of assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1972)) and the class of component...

In this paper we study a class of cooperative sequencing games that arise from one-machine sequencing situations in which chain precedence relations are imposed on the jobs. It is shown that these sequencing games are convex.

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining...