Similar Search Results

C-complete sets for compromise stable games

Platz, Trine Tornøe; Hamers, Herbert; Quant, Marieke - In: Mathematical methods of operations research 80 (2014) 2, pp. 213-223

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010431417

Fixed tree games with repeated players

Miquel, S.; Velzen, Bas van; Hamers, Herbert; Norde, H. W. - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001828797

Resource allocation games : a compromise stable extension of bankruptcy games

Grundel, Soesja; Borm, Peter; Hamers, Herbert - In: Mathematical methods of operations research 78 (2013) 2, pp. 149-169

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010205336

On the Core of Multiple Longest Traveling Salesman Games

Estevez-Fernandez, Arantza; Borm, Peter; Hamers, Herbert - 2004

nonempty core. However, a six player MLTS game may have an empty core. For the special instance where the reward between a pair … of nodes is equal to 0 or 1, we provide relations between the structure of the core and the underlying network …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014071143

Chinese postman games with multi-located players

Estévez-Fernández, Arantza; Hamers, Herbert - In: European journal of operational research : EJOR 285 (2020) 2, pp. 458-469

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012239599

Chinese postman games with repeated players

Estévez-Fernández, Arantza; Hamers, Herbert - 2018

This paper analyses Chinese postman games with repeated players, which generalize Chinese postman games by dropping the one-to-one relation between edges and players. In our model, we allow players to own more than one edge, but each edge belongs to at most one player. The one-to-one relation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011924819