Sacks, Stevenson and Wolfers (2010) question earlier results like Easterlin's showing that long-run economic growth often fails to improve individuals'average reports of their own subjective well-being (SWB). We use World Values Survey data to establish that the proportion of individuals...

Sacks, Stevenson and Wolfers (2010) question earlier results like Easterlin's showing that long-run economic growth often fails to improve individuals' average reports of their own subjective well-being (SWB). We use World Values Survey data to establish that the proportion of individuals...

In large random economies with heterogeneous agents, a standard stochastic framework presumes a random macro state, combined with idiosyncratic micro shocks. This can be formally represented by a ran-dom process consisting of a continuum of random variables that are conditionally independent...

A competitive market mechanism is a prominent example of a non-binary social choice rule, typically defined for a special class of economic environments in which each social state is an economic allocation of private goods, and individuals' preferences concern only their own personal...

An extensive literature in economics uses a continuum of random variables to model individual random shocks imposed on a large population. Let H denote the Hilbert space of square-integrable random variables. A key concern is to characterize the family of all H-valued functions that satisfy the...

In an intertemporal Arrow-Debreu economy with a continuum of agents, suppose that the auctioneer sets prices while the government institutes optimal lump-sum transfers period by period. An earlier paper showed how subgame imperfections arise because agents understand how their current decisions...

Consider an “isolation paradox” game with many identical players. By definition, conforming to a rule which maximizes average utility is individually a strictly dominated strategy. Suppose, however, that some players think “quasi-magically” in accordance with evidential (but not causal)...

Von Neumann (1928) not only introduced a fairly general version of the extensive form game concept. He also hypothesized that only the normal form was relevant to rational play. Yet even in Battle of the Sexes, this hypothesis seems contradicted by players' actual behaviour in experiments. Here...