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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009573514
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This paper develops an equilibrium matching model for a competitive CEO market in which CEOs’ wage and perks are both endogenously determined by bargaining between firms and CEOs. In stable matching equilibrium, firm size, wage, perks and talent are all positively related. Perks are more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010550445
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007606979
This paper develops an equilibrium matching model for a competitive CEO market in which CEOs’ wage and perks are both endogenously determined by bargaining between firms and CEOs. In stable matching equilibrium, firm size, wage, perks and talent are all positively related. Perks are more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014040820