This paper presents an analysis of the joint determination of bureaucratic corruption and economic development. The analysis is based on a simple neo-classical growth model in which bureaucrats are employed as agents of the government to collect taxes from households. Corruption is reflected in...

This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium analysis of public sector corruption and economic growth. In an economy with government intervention and capital accumulation, state-appointed bureaucrats are charged with the responsibility for procuring public goods which contribute to...

This paper investigates the relationship between public investment in transportation and communication and economic growth using traditional instrumental estimation and a mixed fixed and random coefficient approach in the context of a dynamic panel framework. We find that there is a dynamic...

This paper examines the growth effects of government expenditure for a panel of thirty developing countries over the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, with a particular focus on sectoral expenditures. Our methodology improves on previous research on this topic by explicitly recognising the role of...

Economic development and bureaucratic corruption are determined jointly in a dynamic general equilibrium model of growth, bribery and tax evasion. Corruption arises from the incentives of public and private agents to conspire in the concealment of information from the government. These...

The relationship between corruption and economic development is characterised by three stylised facts: (i) a strong negative correlation between corruption and development (ii) countries can remain trapped in high corruption-low development or low corruption-high development equilibria (iii)...