We examine the influence of ownership concentration on payout policy in Japan. According to the monitoring hypothesis, large shareholders prefer higher dividends to mitigate the agency cost of free cash flows. In contrast, the rent extraction hypothesis assumes that large shareholders derive...

We use Keiretsu affiliation to analyze the dividend policy of Japanese firms. Assuming that Keiretsu membership provides monitoring benefits and reduces information asymmetries between managers and investors, we test (1) whether dividend changes are more sensitive to growth opportunities for...

We examine the dividend policy of Japanese firms and find that dividend payout is negatively related to ownership concentration. This result contradicts the argument that dividends are substitute for shareholder monitoring, but supports the assumption that controlling shareholders extract...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to test two agency-based hypotheses regarding the effect of ownership concentration on dividend policy using a large sample of Japanese firms. Design/methodology/approach – Level regressions associating payout rates to ownership concentration are run....

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to test two agency‐based hypotheses regarding the effect of ownership concentration on dividend policy using a large sample of Japanese firms. Design/methodology/approach – Level regressions associating payout rates to ownership concentration are run....