Three values for non-transferable utility games -- the Harsanyi NTU-value, the Shapley NTU-value, and the Maschler-Owen consistent NTU-value -- are compared in a simple example.

Maximizing the revenue from selling two goods (or items) is a notoriously difficult problem, in stark contrast to the single-good case. We show that simple "one-dimensional" mechanisms, such as selling the two goods separately, guarantee at least 73% of the optimal revenue when the valuations of...

We consider the complexity of finding a Correlated Equilibrium in an n-player game in a model that allows the algorithm to make queries for players' utilities at pure strategy profiles. Many randomized regret-matching dynamics are known to yield an approximate correlated equilibrium quickly: in...

Inspired by the existing work on correlated equilibria and regret-based dynamics in games, we carry out a first exploration of the links between the leading equilibrium concept for (exchange) economies, Walrasian equilibrium, and the dynamics, specifically regret-matching dynamics, of trading...

A Lotto game is a two-person zero-sum game where each player chooses a distribution on nonnegative real numbers with given expectation, so as to maximize the probability that his realized choice is higher than his opponent's. These games arise in various competitive allocation setups (e.g.,...

We introduce a simple riskier than order between gambles, from which the index of riskiness developed by Aumann and Serrano (2008) is directly obtained.

This paper undertakes a careful examination of the concept of conditional probability and its use. The ideas are then applied to resolve a conceptual puzzle related to Savage's "Sure-Thing Principle."

Who is Robert Aumann? Is he an economist or a mathematician? A rational scientist or a deeply religious man? A deep thinker or an easygoing person? These seemingly disparate qualities can all be found in Aumann; all are essential facets of his personality. A pure mathematician who is a renowned...