We investigate how VC participation affects the failure of startups. Using a unique data set of the survival of peer-to-peer (P2P) platforms in China, we identify two types of failures, bankruptcy, and run off with investors' money. The Competing Risk Model results show that while VC...

The focus of this paper is whether the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation SHO strengthens or weakens the effect of short-selling threats on banks’ risk-taking. The evidence shows that pilot banks with looser constraints on short-selling increased their risk-taking during the...

This paper investigates how lenders react to borrowers' rating changes under heterogeneous conditions and different regulatory regimes. Our findings suggest that corporate downgrades that increase capital requirements for lending banks under the Basel II framework are associated with increased...

In this study, we investigate the effects of bank safety-oriented culture on loan contracts. We propose a new measure that derives a bank’s safety-oriented culture from its business model. We provide several validation tests to confirm that our measure can represent the safety-oriented culture...

We examine the effect of firm credit rating downgrades on the pricing and structure of syndicated bank loans following rating downgrades in the firms' countries of domicile. We find that the sovereign ceiling policies used by credit rating agencies create a disproportionally adverse impact on...

This study examines whether the flow volatility experienced by institutional investors affects firms' financing costs. Using Greenwood and Thesmar's (2011) stock price fragility, a proxy for firm exposure to its institutional investors' flow volatility, we find that firms with high stock price...

This paper examines the effect of credit rating disagreements on merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions. We show that acquirers with split ratings prefer to use stock to finance their acquisitions. More importantly, we find that acquirers with split ratings experience lower announcement returns....

We augment the LLSV creditor rights index with a new "restructuring index" that measures the incentives provided to creditors to grant concessions outside formal bankruptcy. We study the joint impact of the two indexes on a firm's leverage policy. We show that the two indexes have at most a...

We augment the LLSV creditor rights index with a new “restructuring index” that measures the incentives provided to creditors to grant concessions outside formal bankruptcy. We study the joint impact of the two indexes on a firm's leverage policy. We show that the two indexes have at most a...

This paper investigates the impact of managerial compensation on the likelihood of covenant violations and reports that higher CEO risk-shifting incentives significantly increase the likelihood of covenant violations. Evidence suggests that CEOs with creditor unfriendly compensation in leveraged...