The paper analyzes strategic commodity taxation in a model with trade in a single private good which is simultaneously imported by consumers of a high-tax region and exported by its producers. Conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium are given and an asymmetry is introduced through...

We analyze the restricted origin principle for taxing international trade in a three-country, three-commodity model where two of the countries form an economic union. Using simplifying assumptions with respect to the initial tax equilibrium and the structure of preferences, the effects of a...

An optimal taxation approach is employed to discuss the interaction between factor and commodity taxes for a small open economy when profit-earning firms are mobile internationally. In this framework, a destination-based commodity tax is shown to be superior to an origin-based VAT from an...

The paper sets up an analytical framework within which the arguments for centralized vs. decentralized tax policy can be represented and weighed against each other. Two aspects of the debate are considered: first, the global welfare effects of 'harmonizing' tax reforms are discussed when...

This paper analyses tax competition between a unionised and a non-unionised country for the location of an outside firm. We show that unionisation offers an extra incentive for the government to attract a foreign competitor to a concentrated domestic market, in order to affect the behaviour of...

In many situations governments have sector-specific tax and regulation policies at their disposal to influence the market outcome after a national or an international merger has taken place. In this paper we study the implications for merger policy when countries non-cooperatively deploy...

A widely noticed result by de Crombrugghe and Tulkens (1990) states that asymmetric commodity tax competition always leads to tax rates being too low in both countries, even though there are counteracting tax base and terms of trade effects. This note argues that the result depends crucially on...

We analyze tax competition between two countries of unequal size trying to attract a foreign-owned monopolist. When regional governments have only a lump-sum profit tax (subsidy) at their disposal, but face exogenous and identical transport costs for imports, then both countries will always...