We analyze non-cooperative commodity taxation in a symmetrictwo-country trade model characterized by monopolisticcompetition and international firm and capital mobility. In thissetting, taxes in one country affect foreign welfare through therelocation of mobile firms and through changes in the...

The paper analyzes the implications of allowing for trade deflection under the restricted origin principle. It is shown that (a) producer trade deflection leads to circular trade and must be ruled out to obtain a trade equilibrium, (b) consumer trade deflection will not occur in a Nash...

We analyze the restricted origin principle for taxing international trade in a three-country, three-commodity model where two of the countries form an economic union. Using simplifying assumptions with respect to the initial tax equilibrium and the structure of preferences, the effects of a...

An optimal taxation approach is employed to discuss the interaction between factor and commodity taxes for a small open economy when both profit-earning firms and domestic consumers are imperfectly mobile internationally. In this framework, we demonstrate two main results: first, a...

This paper investigates the macroeconomic and welfare effects of an anticipated future switch from destination- to origin-based commodity taxation. We set up an intertemporal representative agent model of an open economy and study especially consumption, investment and trade balance responses to...

A two-sector trade model with perfect international capital mobility and endogenous supply of specific factors is used to analyze the relation between selective taxes on production (origin-based commodity taxes) and source-based taxes on capital income. A small open economy will set both of...