Showing 1 - 5 of 5
In a two-period game, Player 1 produces zero-day exploits for immediate deployment or stockpiles for future deployment. In Period 2, Player 1 produces zero-day exploits for immediate deployment, supplemented by stockpiled zero-day exploits from Period 1. Player 2 defends in both periods. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200062
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010231692
In a two-period game, Player 1 produces zero-day exploits for immediate deployment or stockpiles for future deployment. In Period 2, Player 1 produces zero-day exploits for immediate deployment, supplemented by stockpiled zero-day exploits from Period 1. Player 2 defends in both periods. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432466
models, which are static and preclude defense and appropriation. The agents jointly determine price through their export …, appropriation cost, and when the future becomes more important, and increases with defense cost, production cost, and usability of … appropriation. Increasing the usability of appropriation and defense cost causes a transition from pure exchange via joint exchange …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005640003
curves are upward sloping (the defender prefers to invest less in defense, thus leading to higher probabilities of success … for attacks on both assets) or downward sloping (e.g. when one asset has a low value or high unit defense cost). This … defense. A two stage game is considered, where the defender moves first and the attacker moves second. When both assets are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011131891