The implementation of European Union directives into national law is at the discretion of member states. We analyze incentives for member states to deviate from these directives when the European Comission may sue a defecting member state and rulings at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are...

The implementation of European Union directives into national law is at the discretion of member states. We analyze incentives for member states to deviate from these directives when the European Commission may sue a defecting member state and rulings at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are...

We develop a simple model that looks at the incentives of private banks to behave prudentially and undertake costly efforts to lower the probability of bankruptcy or having to be bailed out by a lender of last resort. Government regulators can force banks to increase efforts beyond the privately...

We analyze whether financial integration will lead to lower national regulation of domestic banking activities. In our model, banks' efforts and public regulation can lower the probability of bankruptcy. We contrast the national case with an integrated banking market and find that banks will...