environments, transparency may reduce expected welfare from an ex-ante point of view: public announcements serve as a focal point …. Restricting the degree of publicity is a better-suited instrument for preventing the negative welfare effects of public …

behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing 'overreactions' to public signals as shown by Morris and Shin (2002 … levels of reasoning. This paper analyzes the welfare effects of public information under limited levels of reasoning and … information cannot reduce welfare, unless the policy maker has instruments that are perfect substitutes to private actions. …

. Whereas agents have a coordination motive to take the same position, at the social level effective market coordination per se … of publicity are a better instrument with which to prevent the negative welfare effects of public announcements than …

environments, transparency may reduce expected welfare from an ex-ante point of view: public announcements serve as a focal point …. Restricting the degree of publicity is a better-suited instrument for preventing the negative welfare effects of public …

. Whereas agents have a coordination motive to take the same position, at the social level effective market coordination per se … of publicity are a better instrument with which to prevent the negative welfare effects of public announcements than …

environments, transparency may reduce expected welfare from an ex-ante point of view: public announcements serve as a focal point …. Restricting the degree of publicity is a better-suited instrument for preventing the negative welfare effects of public …

welfare if coordination is socially desirable. … behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing 'overreactions' to public signals. We present an experiment based on a … extreme case of a pure coordination game, subjects still use their private signals, preventing full coordination …

behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing 'overreactions' to public signals as shown by Morris and Shin (2002 … levels of reasoning. This paper analyzes the welfare effects of public information under limited levels of reasoning and … information cannot reduce welfare, unless the policy maker has instruments that are perfect substitutes to private actions. …

behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing ‘overreactions’ to public signals as shown by Morris and Shin (2002 … levels of reasoning. This paper analyzes the welfare effects of public information under such limited levels of reasoning and … information cannot reduce welfare, unless the policy maker has instruments that are perfect substitutes to private actions. …

welfare if coordination is socially desirable. … behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing ‘overreactions’ to public signals. We present an experiment based on a … extreme case of a pure coordination game, subjects still use their private signals, preventing full coordination …